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Abstract: Despite hundreds of “Rule of Law” projects at the World Bank and a host of
research into the foundations and content of the Rule of Law, we are still nowhere near
an altogether satisfactory definition. While the Rule of Law is repeatedly being referred
to in ‘legal assistance’ and ‘law reform’ projects and lives as a guiding principle in
constitutions around the world, we don’t seem able to settle on a commonly agreedupon approach to its nature and institutional form. In this context, the Rule of Law
provides an opportunity to engage critically with the differences in perception and bias
from which participants in the debate define and situate the principle and its underlying
values. This short paper argues for a legal pluralist understanding of the Rule of Law as
a set of selective institutional experiences and normative contentions which look very
different when studied across time and space. Complementing some of the work that
has been done in post-colonial studies and by TWAIL (Third World Approaches to
International Law) scholars in law, the ‘transnationalization of the rule of law’ might be
one of the important next frontiers in deconstructing Western and Northern narratives
of legal ordering.
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∗

“Pluralism is most often used in a political context, to describe a state in which many
voices and opinions, and in particular political groupings, are able to co-exist. This is
possible in politics because a choice for one group – an election – simply entails that
the others lose power, not that they cease to exist. This translates rather
uncomfortably to law. A law, or judicial decision, renders other views legally
irrelevant. A legal system, unlike a pluralist political system, does not aim at
maintaining the coexistence of diverse opinions, but rather at ending this state of
affairs, in the name of legal certainty and authority. One may ask whether law can
be, or even should be, pluralist.” 1

I. The Slippery Nature of the Rule of Law

Which signals must we heed in search of assessing and ascertaining the current state of
the ‘rule of law’? Are we to look for instances of triumphant rescue or of tragic failure of
the concept? Must we be on the look-out for judicial pronouncements, legislative
advances or administrative orders to test the rule of law’s current temperature and
mode of operation? Is it sufficient to apply a public law lens in order to seek out the
institutional and procedural forms of the rule of law’s modes of existence and their
possible transformations in a world marked by globalisation, privatization and
attending shifts between governmental regulatory prerogative and the market’s claims
to ‘self-rule’? Or, ought we to include contractual and corporate governance
developments, both still under the auspices of private law, when we attempt to depict
King’s College London. This chapter has benefitted from generous comments and feedback from Daniel
Drache and Jothie Rajah. I am furthermore very grateful for conversations with Harry Arthurs on the use
of the term ‘rule of law’ in the present-day context and indebted to the editors of this volume, Christopher
May and Adam Winchester for very helpful guidance in finalizing the paper.
1 Gareth Davies, What is a pluralist legal system, and is the EU one?, manuscript on file with author,
available at: www3.law.ox.ac/denning-archive/news/events-files/Davies-2.pdf.
∗
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the contours of far-reaching deregulations and the rise of private regulatory regimes in
both industry and former public service areas? When studying the rule of law ‘in action’,
its mode of generating knowledge and processing information, its instruments of
‘control’, of surveillance and intervention – how does a traditional constitutional or
administrative rule of law perspective apply to the increasingly dominant role played by
private companies exercising near-to-complete control over data flows?2 Where, in the
inherited model of constitutional supremacy and separation of powers are we to
account for the expansion of private arbitration tribunals in charge of settling
investment disputes between sovereign states and multinationals?3 Who is in charge, in
other words, who is responsible and competent to care for the hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons today, refugees, uprooted and set adrift? What sense does it make to
speak of a rule of law, when we are no longer confident from which vantage point to
define ‘citizenship’, ‘home’, ‘belonging’?4 How are we to interpret momentous instances,
regarding their far-reaching impact, despite their local occurrence? What is the longterm significance of the much anticipated decision of the UK High Court regarding
parliamentary approval of the government’s triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty of the
European Union5 or the outcome of the 2016 presidential election in the United States?6
And, from which vantage point and perspective are such assessments to be made?
Not only, then, are the challenges confronting an aspirationally open-minded and
critical engagement with the rule of law political and geographical, but also definitional.
There are, arguably, only a few other categories, concepts or ideas for lawyers as heavily
Shoshana Zuboff, Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization, 30
Journal of Information Technology 75 (2015).
3 Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2006); MS Sornarajah, Resistance and
Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (2015).
4 Zumbansen, How, Where and for Whom? Interrogating Law's Forms, Locations and Purposes, Inaugural
Lecture,
Kings
College,
28
April
2016,
available
here:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2786698; see also Neha Vora, Impossible
Citizens (2013), at 12: “…an approach to studying citizenship and belonging that attends to the circulation
and practice of multiple forms of governance in contemporary nation-states. This approach avoids
exceptionalizing particular parts of the world and instead acknowledges that globally and locally
circulating vocabulatires of economy, belonging, and rights are assembled, disassembled, and
reassembled everywhere.”.
5 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2016] EWHC 2768 (admin), 3 November
2016, available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exitingthe-european-union/
6 See the following links: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-09/donald-trump-wins-us-electiondefeats-hillary-clinton/8006776;
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21710012something-between-reaganism-and-frances-national-front-probably-what-expect?fsrc=permar|image3.
2
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charged and contested as that of the ‘rule of law’ [RoL]. While references to the RoL
abound and the concept is arguably one of the most frequently alluded to when
debating the foundations and aspirations of a modern legal system,7 the term itself
continues to remain open-ended, contested as well as burdened with conflicting
normative assertions: while it conjures community as well as insists on authority and
emphasizes rule-boundedness as well as promises enforceability, it does not say very
much outright as to its stakeholders and its constituents, those who give it legitimacy
and those who are affected by it. Whose Rule of Law are we speaking of, which values
are enshrined in its concrete instantiation in a particular place and time? Which
processes of legitimation and execution does it require or presuppose? Which actors are
considered central or peripheral to the optimal operation of the RoL? Which norms can
the RoL not do without, and what is their place in the RoL’s system? Does the RoL
require a hierarchy of norms, and does the concept itself allow for an identification of
the values for that hierarchy?
The significance of the RoL within the legal (and political) imagination, as numerous
attempts to define and conceptualize,8 theorize, challenge9 and resist it,10 have shown,
might just as well be its irreducibly ambiguous character. Its slippery nature not only
invites both the interpretation from various points of view and the translation between
its use in legal, political, socio-economic, historical and anthropological and sociological
discourses, it demands them. But, seen through this lens, the ‘RoL problem’ for law
echoes the challenges which other disciplines tend to encounter with ‘core’ concepts.
Imagine asking a philosopher to provide us with a summary regarding the idea of
See the masterful analysis and overview of approaches by Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law
(2004). But, see also the World Bank’s inclusion of the RoL as one of “six dimensions of governance” as
part
of
its
“Worldwide
Governance
Indicators
Programme”:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/rule-of-law.
8 For a very helpful and insightful guide to competing interventions, see Christopher May, The Rule of
Law. The Common Sense of Global Politics (2014), ch. 2 (“Defining the rule of law, between thick and thin
conceptions”, id., at 33-56.
9 Katharina Pistor/Antara Haldar/Amrit Amirapu, Social norms, rule of law, and gender reality. An essaay
on the limits of the dominant rule of law paradigm, in: Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law 241
(Heckman/Nelson/Cabatingan, eds., 2010), who address the RoL’s shortcomings in capturing and
theorizing levels of inequality, using women as but one example; see also the critique of the World Justice
Forum’s ‘Rule of Law’ index, which prioritizes a limited range of economic and political factors to the
detriment of others: Jothie Rajah, 'Rule of Law' as Transnational Legal Order, in: Transnational Legal
Orders 340 (Halliday/Shaffer, eds., 2015).
10 See Edward Palmer Thompson, Whigs and Hunters. The Origins of the Black Act (1975), and Alvaro
Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic Development, in: The New Law
and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal 253 (Trubek/Santos, eds., 2006).
7
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‘truth’11 or of ‘beauty’.12 Or, if we asked a political theorist to define ‘order’,13 or a (legal)
philosopher to offer a satisfying definition of ‘justice’.14 Similarly related to these types
of questions in the context of the RoL are those which are now raised within the fields of
geography, legal geography and spatial studies with regard to ‘jurisdiction’ and to the
‘place of law’.
Several crucial parameters become visible here: on the one hand, scholars in these fields
debate the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ situatedness of legal orders while simultaneously
emphasizing the contextual embeddedness of the legal architecture in historically
evolving political orders and, more particularly, that of law’s role in the West’s
emergence of the nation-state15 and the capitalist order.16 On the other, the RoL’s
normative ambiguity, in other words, its slippery assertion of a value system caught up,
endorsed and given validity in the constitution and the execution of an institutionalized
legal architecture prompts challenge and resistance on various other levels. The RoL
both posits and questions normative assertions of a legal order and how and for whom
it is established. Who is setting up the RoL, whose values does it serve to represent and
protect? As such, the critique of the RoL cannot be sensibly separated from an
assessment of the historical and socio-economic context in which a particular
instantiation of the RoL is being debated, something which E. P. Thompson so
masterfully laid out in the bulk of ‘Whigs’ that precedes the famous observations on the
rule of law at the end of the book, too often cited in isolation from the rest.17 In that
context, then, it also became visible how the RoL raises significant concerns regarding
Crispin Wright, Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed, 28 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1998).
Jennifer McMahon, Beauty, in: The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed. 307 (Gaut/Lopes, eds.,
2005).
13 Nancy Fraser/Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003).
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality,
Species Membership (2006); Amartya Sen, Global Justice, in: Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law 55
(Heckman/Nelson/Cabatingan, eds., 2000).
15 Austin Sarat/Lawrence Douglas/Martha Merrill Umphrey, Where (or What) Is the Place of LAw? An
Introduction, in: The Place of Law 1 (Sarat/Douglas/Merrill Umphrey, eds., 2006), 2: “[Q]uestions of
jurisdiction lead us to consider the very sources and limits of legal authority, and to consider the law’s
role in the construction of the classical political form of Western modernity: the sovereign nation-state.”
16 “Weber’s account sees the rule of law as contributing to the rationalization of contemporary capitalist
society, but (in a dialectical relationship) also reflecting such rationalization.” May, Rule of Law (2014),
34. In that vein, compare David Trubek’s seminal analysis: David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise
of Capitalism, Wisconsin Law Review 720 (1972), at 724, 725: “…Weber believed that European law was
more ‘rational’ than the legal systems of other civilizations, that is, it was more highly differentiated (or
autonomous), consciously constructed, general, and universal. […] The failure of other civilizations to
develop rational law helped explain why only in Europe could modern, industrial capitalism arise.”
17 Edward Palmer Thompson, Whigs and Hunters. The Origins of the Black Act (1975).
11
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its relation to other formations of ‘legal’ ordering. One of the key questions in
Thompson’s analysis concerned the relationship between the ‘legal’ order with which
the newly introduced system, represented by the ominous ‘Black Act’, was confronted.
Rather than presupposing a legal void, the carefully presented analysis made the
tension visible and tangible that existed between what was already in place and the
more recent superimposition. The recognition of a legal pluralist universe in which a
legal positivist order intervenes and with which it will (perhaps forever) stand in
tension, is an insight of absolutely crucial significance. When the renowned
anthropologist, Sally Engle Merry, published a short article on “Legal Pluralism” in the
Law & Society Review in 1988, its appearance marked an important intervention in an
already lively debate, which touched upon the nerve of legal theory right and left. At the
outset of her article, Professor Merry observed:
“The intellectual odyssey of the concept of legal pluralism moves from the
discovery of indigenous forms of law among remote African villagers and New
Guinea tribesmen to debates concerning the pluralistic qualities of law under
advanced capitalism. In the last decade, the concept of legal pluralism has been
applied to the study of social and legal ordering in urban industrial societies,
primarily the United States, Britain, and France. Indeed, given a sufficiently broad
definition of the term legal system, virtually every society is legally plural, whether
or not it has a colonial past. Legal pluralism is a central theme in the
reconceptualization of the law/society relation.”18
Looking at the RoL through a legal pluralist lens reveals a complex and constantly
shifting and evolving assemblage of actors, norms and processes. Instead of a neatly
constituted and institutionalized system of, say, ‘checks and balances’,19 ‘constitutional
democracy’,20 and the legality principle,21 we are confronted with a living organism,
pulsating and shaking, multidimensional and with sensitive nervous fibers, operating at
different levels of the political, cultural and socio-economic system. Most importantly,
however, the legal pluralist RoL presents us with a methodological challenge. Echoing
the challenges that early private-law oriented approaches to comparative law would
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 Law & Society Review 869 (1988), 869.
Compare Federalist Paper No. 51, “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper and
Balances Between the Different Departments”, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp.
20 Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 Southern
California Law Review 1307 (2001), 1308.
21 Compare the RoL definition as offered by the World Justice Project, which posits, inter alia, that: “The
government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under
the law.” See http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law.
18
19

6

pose for efforts to elaborate a comprehensive framework for the study of comparative
public law, which does not reduce public law to anything ‘governmental’, done by the
state22, the legal pluralist perspective on the RoL must seek to decenter the material
infrastructure of the state, its institutions and processes as based on constitutional and
administrative law.

II. Legal Pluralism and Its Many Effects

At the same time, we how may we explain the considerable gap between legal pluralist
approaches to the study of the RoL and other contemporary work? Is there a valid
concern of the use of a legal pluralist lens leading us too far away from what would
otherwise have been the conceptual frameworks to be employed for the task of studying
the RoL in a transformed, globalised context? But, which concepts would be adequate
today? Which conception, definition or model of the RoL should we take as our
reference point and which disciplinary (law, political science, ‘governance studies’,
sociology, anthropology) or subdisciplinary frameworks (comparative, ‘global’ and
‘transnational’ constitutional law,23 ‘global administrative law’,24 comparative politics,
‘fragmented sovereignties’, ‘assemblages’25 or Sharma and Gupta’s ‘anthropology of the
state’26)?
The problem with the opening of the door to contesting voices is that not only is the
door never to be shut again, but it also becomes clear how that door can at best only
ever have been a curtain, a drapery, a sound-muffling cloth that both blocked the view
Konrad Zweigert/Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. (1996); Jonathan Hill,
Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101 (1989); Sunil
Khilnani/Vikram Raghavan/Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Introduction: Reviving South Asian Comparative
Constitutionalism,
in:
Comparative
Constitutionalism
in
South
Asia
1
(Khilnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam, eds., 2013), 11.
23 For an overview of the literature at the time, see Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and
Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Constitutional Pluralist Order, 1 Global
Constitutionalism 16 (2012).
24 Benedict Kingsbury/Nico Krisch/Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law
& Contemporary Problems 15 (2005).
25 Stephen J. Collier/Aihwa Ong (ed.^eds.), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as
Anthropological Problems (2008).
26 Aradhana Sharma/Akhil Gupta (ed.^eds.), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (2005).
22
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and the ears for what are in fact the manifold cross-relations between mainstream and
alternative, centre and periphery, North and South accounts of the RoL and
constitutionalism. Such, at least, is the impression we begin to gain when looking
beyond the solid and richly stacked library of Western constitutional law and Rule of
Law theory. Once we let our gaze wander in the search of references to and analyses of
the RoL ‘in the Global South’, we embark on a journey that is in so many ways
experimental. It is neither clear from the outset, where the journey is headed, nor what
is expected to be found, discovered – yes, even learned at the end. Similarly, and rather
quickly, it begins to dawn on us, that by making the attempt to ‘provincialise’27 Western
narratives of the RoL and closely situated traditions of comparative and even ‘global’
constitutional law,28 we are at a loss of clearly defining where I am looking and, indeed,
for what.
Rejecting a traditional and highly influential North-American and European bias and
focus on the part of much ‘comparative constitutional law’,29 scholars from the ‘global
south’, in particular, have been arguing for a widening, if not a reversal of perspective.
Scholars such as Rachel Sieder, Javier Couso and Alexandra Huneeus, picking up on the
theme of ‘judicialization of politics’,30 have recently pressed for a legal culture
perspective on the already actively studied processes of judicial interventions in
different societal transformation processes in Latin America. Sieder and her colleagues
argue for a three-fold expansion of the existing analysis by political science, theory and
law scholars on the role played by law and legal institutions in Latin America, first, by
claiming a particular role of the concept of legal culture to expose the symbolic and
discursive dimensions of law, second, by drawing on the ‘law and society’ movement to
Compare Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,
2nd ed. [orig. 2000] (2007).
28 Antje Wiener, Global Constitutionalism: Mapping an Emerging Field. Background paper for the
Conference:
Constitutionalism
in
a
New
Key?,
Berlin
28-29
January
2011
(http://cosmopolis.wzb.eu/content/program/conkey_Wiener_Mapping-Field.pdf) (2011).
29 “The newly revitalized field of comparative constitutional law has tended to let Europe and North
America and Europe dictate the agenda.” Rosalind Dixon/Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: Comparative
Constitutional Law, in: Research Handbook on Comparative Constitutional Law 1 (Dixon/Ginsburg, eds.,
2011), 1.
30 Compare here Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in: The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics
119 (Caldeira/Kelemen/Whittington, eds., 2008). See also the contributions to Rachel Sieder/Line
Schjolden/Alan Angell (ed.^eds.), The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (2005). A fascinating
study on the interpretive-political space opened up by the judicialization of politics is offered by Philip
Liste, Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialized Knowledge: Kiobel and the ‘Politics of
Space’, 5 Transnational Legal Theory 1 (2014).
27
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render more visible the impact that extrajudicial actors and developments have on the
formal legal system, and, third, by contextualizing the ‘judicialization of politics’ within
the concrete developments in Latin America – rather than comparing local instances
against an alleged matrix imported from the North. “…judicialization in the developing
world unfolds in a context in important ways different from that of developed countries
with longer histories of centralization of power.”31
Similarly, the renowned Colombian socio-legal scholar, César Rodríguez-Garavito,
recently published a forceful call-to-arms for a new, locally based and locally informed
approach to the study of law & society with regard to the transformations currently
underway in a number of countries in Latin America. Lamenting that “Latin American
scholars spend an excessive amount of time, resources and energies assimilating,
translating and interpreting (or simply ‘staying current’ with) materials in the North”,
while with regard to legal theory “[i]n their writings about the law, Latin American
authors have a marked predilection for exegesis and commentary without reference to
the actual practice of law or, even less, the reality of how law is applied in local
contexts”, Rodríguez-Garavito concludes, that “[m]any scholars try to explain
institutions and legal practices in the region by comparing their realities with ideal
types (in a normative sense, that is to say, as superior models) extracted from an
uncritical reading of the realities of Europe or the United States.”32 Drawing, on the one
hand, on Sousa Santos’ image of law as ‘a map of misreading’, and, on the other, on
Diego López’ seminal study from 200433 and, in particular, López’ suggestion to
distinguish between (the North as) a “site of production” and (the South as) a ‘site of
reception’ for legal theory, legal-political concepts and legal philosophical principles,34
Alexandra Huneeus/Javier Couso/Rachel Sieder, Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political
Activism in Contemporary Latin America, in: Cultures of Legality. Judicialization and Political Activism in
Contemporary Latin America 3 (Couso/Huneeus/Sieder, eds., 2010), 5.
32 César Rodríguez-Garavito, Remapping law and society in Latin America. Visions and topics for a new
legal cartography, in: Law and Society in Latin America. A New Map 1 (Rodríguez-Garavito, ed., 2015), 3,
4.
33 Diego Eduardo López Medina, Teoría impura del derecho. La transformación de la cultura jurídica
latinoamericana. Prólogo de Duncan Kennedy (2004), 15-21.
34 López Medina, Teoría impura, at 15: “La filosofía del derecho presenta un grueso blindaje frente a un
posible asalto del perspectivismo teórico. De esta forma se genera la impression que la filosofía de
derecho son discursos abstractos de alcance global. (…) Ese campo intellectual transnacional en el que los
iusteóricos nos hallamos inmersos podría denominarse teoría tansnacional del derecho (TTD)…” [The
philosophy of law presents a firm armor front against a possible assault of theoretical perspective. From
this form arises the impression that the philosophy of law consists of abstract discourses of global scope.
(…) This intellectual transnational camp in which we found immersed the jurisprudes might be called
31
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Rodríguez-Garavito sets out to propose a ‘new legal cartography’. In light of a by now
well-routinized practice of studying law (and society) in Latin America through the use
of imported and assimilated conceptual approaches and categories, he asks a number of
guiding questions:
“How can we escape this trap? How can we overcome the continuing legacy of lawand-development thinking? How can critical scholarly perspectives, from inside
and outside the region, foster a horizontal transnational dialogue among equals
about law in Latin America? How can we create a community of scholars that
produce richer theoretical and empirical analyses, and foster legal practices that
deepen democracy, equality, plurality and human rights in Latin America?”35
Among the elements he identifies in the existing and emerging socio-legal scholarship in
Latin America to contribute to a more locally oriented analysis and understanding, is
the detailed study of different constitutionalist projects in the region, focusing not only
on the place of socio-economic rights in many constitutional texts, but on the particular
role played by constitutional courts and tribunals in enforcing such rights. Connected
hereto and indeed echoing the analysis offered by Sieder and her colleagues is the
emphasis on the importance of impact studies regarding the real-world consequences of
ambitious constitutional shifts.36 Another important application site in this regard is the
intensification in courts as well as public debates of the treatment of and the
engagement with rights of indigenous and other racially discriminated peoples, brought
into the spotlight of wide attention, for example, through the growing resistance against
the granting of mining licenses for foreign multinationals and the frequent cases of
expropriation and dramatic displacement of affected indigenous communities.37 In the

transnational theory of law (TTL)…” [PZ transl.] On p.16, he continues: “La TTD se produce comúnmente
en un lugar que me gustaría caracterizar abstractamente come ‘sitio de producción’. Un sitio de
producción parece ser un medio especial en donde se producen discusiones iusteóricas con altos niveles
de influencia transnacional sobre la naturaleza y las políticas del derecho. Los sitios de producción están
usualmente afincados en los círculos intelectuales e instituciones académicas de Estados-nación centrales
y prestigiosos.” And, on p.17, he goes to contrast them with the ‘sites of reception’: “La contracara des los
sitios de producción son los sitios de recepción. Dentro de un sitio de recepción, por lo general, la
iusteoría producida allí ya no tiene la persuasividad y circulacíon amplia de la TTD, sino que, por el
contrario, uno estaría tentado a hablar major de iusteoría ‘local’, ‘regional’, ‘particular’ o ‘comparada’.”
35 Rodríguez-Garavito, Remapping, at 5.
36 Rodríguez-Garavito, Remapping, at 9.
37 Id., at 11-12. See also the United Nations’ “Indigenous Peoples Indigenous Voices Fact Sheet”, 2009 (?),
entitled:
Indigenous
Peoples
and
Industrial
Corporations,
available
at:
http://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/pdf/Indigenous_Industry_Eng.pdf. There, it says on p.2.:
“Particularly serious challenges to indigenous rights are generated by mega-projects, such as mining, oil,
gas and timber extraction, monoculture plantations and dams. The impact of such projects includes

10

words of Julian Burger of the University Essex, who authored the 2014 research report
on “Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries and Human Rights” for the European
Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, “Human rights abuses associated with the
exploration and exploitation of non-renewable resources include, among others,
violation of the right to life, forced displacement and destruction of the environment on
which indigenous peoples depend.”38 While these local consequences of foreign direct
investment by foreign multinationals in resource exporting regions around the world
have long been a central focal point and driver of demands for the sovereign permanent
use of natural resources39, the problem as described by protagonists and supporters of
investor state arbitration is regularly described as one of expropriation – of the
corporation through regulatory interventions by the host state.40 An article published in
the fall of 2016 in the Harvard Law Review concluded that “one factor driving the
continuing conflict between indigenous peoples and natural-resource development
relates to power imbalances between two divergent international legal regimes —
indigenous rights and international investment law — that demand that states act in
conflicting ways regarding the same territory and peoples.”41 Meanwhile, the continued
and arguably growing dependency of the global economy on accessing natural
resources prompts further efforts in developing a basis for natural resource exploitation

environmental damage to traditional lands in addition to loss of culture, traditional knowledge and
livelihoods, often resulting in conflict and forced displacement, further marginalization, increased poverty
and a decline in the health of indigenous peoples.”
38 Julian Burger, Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries and Human Rights, report for the European
Parliament’s
Subcommittee
on
Human
Rights,
Strasbourg,
2014,
available
at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534980/EXPO_STU%282014%29534980
_EN.pdf, at 5.
39 In the words of George Foster, these experiences form “part of a broad, global pattem
of encroachment of private commercial interests onto the lands of indigenous peoples, facilitated by
national governments, which began long ago and has never stopped.” See George K. Foster, Foreign
Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting Equlibrium between Economic Development and
Indigenous Rights, 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 627 (2012), at 629.
40 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Working Paper on International Investment,
“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, September 2004,
available here: https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf, highlighting the
remaining lack of clarity in distinguishing between ‘indirect expropriation’ and legitimate, noncompensable regulation: “Scholars recognised the existence of the distinction but did not shed much light
on the criteria for making the distinction. This may reflect reluctance to attempt to lay down simple, clear
rules in a matter that is subject to so many varying and complex factual patterns and a preference to leave
the resolution of the problem to the development of arbitral decisions on a case-by-case basis.” (Id., at 910).
41 See The Double Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries (Developments
in
the
Law),
129
Harvard
Law
Review
(2016),
1755,
online
at:
http://harvardlawreview.org/2016/04/the-double-life-of-international-law-indigenous-peoples-andextractive-industries/ (conclusion).
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within the body of foreign investment law,42 arguably without too much concern for the
perspective of the displaced peoples affected by the FDI.
How, then, can we study the connections between these dramatic conflicts between
different contentions regarding the content of economic and political rights, on the one
hand, and the changing perspectives in comparative and ‘global’ constitutional law, on
the other? Which methodological tools are required to make visible the place of the
‘RoL’ in a much wider space of legal-theoretical and socio-economic contention? An
important set of sign-posts can be taken from ‘law and development’ scholarship in
which the assertion of the RoL has always been contested and where scholars have long
been stressing the importance of studying the presently offered models of the RoL
against a complex and violent history of colonial rule and imperialism.43 This
scholarship has very productively informed and been in dialogue with work on
indigenous rights, legal pluralism and the more recently emerged concept of
‘transformative constitutionalism’.44
These, admittedly crudely preliminary and selective, insights gained from no more than
a glimpse at constitutionalism discourses in Latin America through the lens of locally
experienced transformations, shaped by local and regional discourses, political and
judicial interventions as well as public debates seems, however, to reveal the blind spots
of what Diego López Medina calls ‘TTD’. In applying a set of constitutional law principles
as they were developed in North America and Western Europe as a yardstick against
and in comparison to which developments in other parts of the world can be measured,
the TTD represents no more than what Medina depicted as an ‘abstract discourse of
global scope’. What escapes the parameters of such abstract theorizing is the particular
nature of what happens locally, and what cannot be studied from the high oxygen-less
Jorge E. Viñuales, International Investment Law and Natural Resource Governance. E15Initiative.
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic
Forum, 2015, available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Extractive-VinualesFINAL1.pdf.
43 David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 Yale
Law Journal 1 (1972). See also the insightful critique of the continuities of colonial understandings of the
elite being in charge of the rule of law by Jorge L. Esquirol, The Latin American Tradition of Legal Failure, 2
Comparative Law Review 1 (2011), 9.
44 Natalia Angel-Cabo/Domingo Lovera Parmo, Latin American social constitutionalism: courts and
popular participation, in: Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice. Critical Inquiries 85 (Alviar
García/Klare/Williams, eds., 2015).
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altitude of theoretical discourses alone. And it is the resistance against such abstract
and, by consequence, hegemonizing theorizing which informs and drives a lot of critical,
local scholarship and which experts in the Global North and the West need to engage
with.45 As the 21st century promises more geopolitical change and North-South and
South-South shifts, traditions of American and European constitutionalism are not likely
to provide the all-sufficient conceptual and theoretical guidelines.46
Similar impulses to rethink, to re-localise and to critically reassess the Western
influence on shaping ‘global’ and ‘comparative’ constitutional law as the taken-forgranted frameworks for thinking about the Rule of Law also come from Asia. Not only
are important and groundbreaking judicial developments widely discussed as matters
of not merely ‘local’ concern47, but what becomes visible is a far-reaching critique of
many of the inherited assumptions regarding the purpose and scope of comparative
constitutional law:
“The dominant players in the field of comparative law extolled the virtues of a
‘functionalist’ approach which would use comparative models and examples to
solve problems and arrive at practical solutions. It was therefore natural that
comparative constitutional law would also be affected by this overall approach.
See, for example, the contributions to the important collection of essays resulting from a collaboration
among scholars in Colombia and the United States: Helena Alviar García/Karl Klare/Lucy A. Williams
(ed.^eds.), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice. Critical Inquiries (2015). See also two
recent, well-informed overviews of theory developments in Latin America from Germany, one from the
director at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg (Armin von Bogdandy, Ius Constitutionale Commune en
América Latina - Beobachtungen zu einem transformatorischen Ansatz demokratischer
Verfassungsstaatlichkeit, 75 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV - HJIL) 345 (2015), and one
from a young legal scholar at the Viadrina University in Frankfurt (Oder): Heiner Fechner, Neue
Rechtstheorie(n) in Lateinamerika. Vom Alternativen Recht zum Emanzipatorischen Rechtspluralismus, 48
Kritische Justiz 446 (2015).
46 Jean Comaroff/John L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward
Africa (The Radical Imagination) (2011); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial
Thought and Historical Difference, 2nd ed. [orig. 2000] (2007); Hamid Dabashi, Can Non-Europeans
Think? (With a foreword by Walter Mignolo) (2015). See also Sunil Khilnani/Vikram Raghavan/Arun K.
Thiruvengadam, Introduction: Reviving South Asian Comparative Constitutionalism, in: Comparative
Constitutionalism in South Asia 1 (Khilnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam, eds., 2013), 10-11: “Even as
scholars have termed this era ‘the heyday for scholars of comparative constitutional law and politics’,
they are quick to acknowledge that certain ‘foundational, ontological, epistemological and methodological
questions concerning the field’s purpose, scope and nature’ still need to be addressed.”
47 Rehan Abeyratne/Nilesh Sinha, Insular and Inconsistent: India’s Naz Foundation Judgment in
Comparative Perspective, 39 Yale Journal of International Law (online) 74 (2014); Sujit Choudhry, How to
Do Comparative Constitutional Law in India: Naz Foundation, Same Sex Rights, and Dialogical
Interpretation, in: Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia 45 (Khi-lnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam,
eds., 2013), 46: “Is the Indian Constitution merely a legal means to implement rights, that exist
independently and apart from the Indian constitutional order, in universal principles of liberal political
morality?” .
45
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Subsequently, comparative law also developed a more ‘universalist’ rationale,
which posits that a community’s conceptions of law, politics, and justice could be
enriched by studying foreign experiences.”48
Resisting the circular referral to the ‘usual suspects’ in global/comparative
constitutional law – including “Canada, Israel, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, and the United States”49 – locally informed efforts of giving voice to
alternative,

non-hegemonic

and

non-mainstream

lines

of

constitutional

law

development are making the map more detailed, but at the same time more messy and
more incoherent. “The appellation ‘South Asia’ constitutes variegated feats of colonial
and imperial geographies, subsequently reinforced by the time-places of the Cold War
and disciplines curiously names as ‘area studies’. […] ...given the ‘genius’ of colonial rule
to produce ‘severely divided societies suffused with ‘political’ constructions of
‘ethnicity’, questions concerning the enunciation of basic human rights of religious,
cultural, and linguistic minorities haunt forms of ‘South Asian constitution-making and
development.”50 For Upendra Baxi, this assessment prepares the ground for a call for “a
new postcolonial nomenclature”, which is informed by a fundamental recognition of the
colonial heritages that influence constitution-making:
“To state the obvious, SAC [South Asian Constitutionalism] founding choices
remain ambivalent. Choosing forms of governance is never an endeavor at wiping
the slate of history clean! More to the point, perhaps, are acts of re-writing that
may render a little more legible some future histories of SAC. And there is ‘more’
to governance than entailed in formulation of constitutional texts, read merely as
exercises in miming available EuroAmerican constitutional models!”51

III. The Rule of Law as a Mediator of Entitlements: North, South, or
Transnational?

Upendra Baxi’s critique of a tradition that, in benign neglect of the underlying colonial
Khilnani et al, Introduction, 11.
Choudhry, How to Do, at 47.
50 Upendra Baxi, Modelling 'Optimal' Constitutional Design for Government Structures. Some Debutant
Remarks, in: Comparative Constitutionalism in South Asia 23 (Khilnani/Raghavan/Thiruvengadam, eds.,
2013), 24, 25.
51 Baxi, Modelling, 29.
48
49
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heritage which continues to exert its stronghold via constitutional design export,
foreign direct investment and trade rules, is not merely directed against constitutional
principles of Western design. More specifically, the target is the narrowing of a horizon
of possibilities that results from having accepted the idea of a constitution and of
constitutionalism as “governance machines”, through which particular and externally
imposed incarnations of economic and political order are inscribed into a country’s
DNA.52
This observation echoes the concerns raised in the context of clashing entitlements and
rights between foreign direct investment protagonists and local indigenous
communities, mentioned earlier. At the centre of that confrontation are competing
interpretations of the economic orientation of the constitutional text as it serves as the
basis for a balancing of individual and collective rights. In 2008, the indigenous rights
scholar, Lillian Aponte Miranda pointed to
“a marked increase in the number of natural resource extraction projects, often
executed through the joint efforts of states and transnational business enterprises,
[which] has aggravated the threat to indigenous peoples’ ability to control their
traditional lands and resources.4 The execution of natural resource extraction
projects typically implicates indigenous peoples’ land tenure systems and formal
state law regarding the ownership and allocation of the territory at issue. Thus,
these projects often force an interface between the distinct legal orders of
indigenous peoples and the state.”53
This example of clashes between a property rights-based understanding of international
investment law, on the one hand, and indigenous uses and traditional title to land, on
the other, attains further poignancy in that it illustrates the point made earlier about
Weber. For Weber already it was clear that a legal order does neither emerge nor stand
in isolation from the socio-economic developments that are going on around it. And, as
scholars in the newly revived tradition of Weber-inspired economic sociology of law
suggest, there is today a pressing urgency to unpack the law’s connection to and its role

Baxi, Modelling, 28.
Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary Relationship Between
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems and International Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of
Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10 Oregon Review of International Law 419 (2008),
421.
52
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in fostering certain models of economic governance through state institutions.54
As much of Western legal and political theory remains focused on the analysis of the
rise of the nation state, the role and legacies of civil revolutions and the fate of the
(European, Westphalian) nation-state in the 21st century, post-colonial scholars have
been drawing different historical lineages in the construction of political identity and
sovereignty between the times of European colonial expansion and the present.55 The
repercussions on law and legal theory are only slowly becoming fully accessible. ‘Postcolonial’ legal thought, if we were to apply this label to such an undertaking, is
impossible to define. Its very nature, which comes into focus only by looking at different
critical approaches in a range of disciplines in the humanities at the same time, appears
thus to defy a unifying definition. What becomes visible then, are complex, multi- and
interdisciplinary efforts to resist, unpack and challenge universalizing narratives,
concepts and explanations as well as objectifying accounts and streamlining historical
narratives. Law and legal scholarship have been playing an intriguing part in such
efforts. With globalization having had unearthing effects on the imaginary and
conceptual ties between the Western state and the idea of modernity56, those on law
and politics and their particular nexus with the state have been considered as being just
as significant.57
What such accounts tend to treat with less emphasis, however, is the ‘ outside’ of the
See, inter alia, Sabine Frerichs, From Credit to Crisis: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and the Other Side of the
Coin, 40 Journal of Law and Society 7 (2013); Richard Swedberg, The Case for an Economic Sociology of
Law, 32 Theory and Society 1 (2003), and the fantastic analysis by the feminist and post-colonial scholar,
Prabha Kotiswaran, Do Feminists Need an Economic Sociology of Law?, 40 Journal of Law and Society 115
(2013).
55 Eve Darian-Smith/Peter Fitzpatrick, Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction, in: Laws of the
Postcolonial 1 (Darian-Smith/Fitzpatrick, eds., 1999).
56 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (1996), 19: “Nation-states,
as units in a complex interactive system, are not very likely to be the long-term arbiters of the
relationship between globality and modernity.”
57 Thus goes the standard account among many public lawyers, sociologists and political scientists. See,
e.g., Stefano Battini, The Globalization of Public Law, 18 European Review of Public Law 27 (2006); Philip
J. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 International Organisation 595
(1995), and Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (1999), 4: “The emerging
literature about globalization is characterized by marked diversity… However, as a broad introductory
generalization, it can be said that it is very much engaged in a debate about the retreat or resilience of the
state. […] Viewed in these polarized terms, the state is either the object or the subject of globalization.”
Placing this against the background of a liberal theory, that is based on the distinction between public and
private and the national and international, is Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, trans. by
Pensky (2001), ch. 1.
54
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story, the ‘other’, the alternative perspective on the described trajectory. This kind of
Eurocentrism has thus become object of various critical attacks,58 and legal
scholarship’s engagement with postcolonial studies must be seen, at least in those
quarters where it is occurring, as both irreversible and transformative.59 Meanwhile, the
implications of postcolonialism on the study of law are as diversified as the field, the
idea, the conceptions (of postcolonialism) themselves. In the legal field with the more
notable, if still marginal60 engagement with postcolonialism and ‘third world critical
historiography, international law,61 a very productive critique has started to take hold
in a number of different subfields – ranging from human rights to international trade, or
from investment to environmental law.
In two powerful works of the last few years, the authors have deliberately and
consciously placed their analysis of the RoL in both conceptual-methodological as well
as historical-political contexts. Studying Sundhya Pahuja’s monographic treatment,
‘Decolonising International Law’,62 we are offered a razor-sharp analysis of the abyss
between the paper-form and the real-world impact of the legal forms which
accompanied the transition of ex-colonized nations into the formal status of ‘sovereign
and equal’ members of the United Nations. Pahuja bookends her scrutiny of the rights of
passage from colonization into sovereign state-hood with a series of reflections about
the process through which a certain power constellation comes under law and is, in
other words, ‘legalized’. In that regard, Pahuja argues at the beginning of her book that
“...the ‘universalisation’ of international law […] was not the neutral inclusion of all
peoples within the international legal order, but rather a process by which a particular
See, e.g., the work by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Processes of Globalisation, Eurozine
http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2002 (2002); see also the excellent collection and commentary by
William Twining, Human Rights, Southern Voices. Francis Deng, Abdullahi An-Na'im, Yash Ghai and
Upendra Baxi (2009).
59 Eve Darian-Smith/Peter Fitzpatrick, Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction, in: Laws of the
Postcolonial 1 (Darian-Smith/Fitzpatrick, eds., 1999), at 1: “It is by now close to a truism in the literature
of postcolonialism, and elsewhere, that European or Western identity is constituted in opposition to an
alterity that it has itself constructed.”
60 James T. Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative
Bibliography, 3 Trade, Law and Development 26 (2011).
61 Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the
Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 513 (2002); see also Jochen von
Bernstorff, German International Law Scholarship and the Postcolonial Turn, EJIL Talk! (Blog of the
European Journal of International Law), 7 January 2015, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/germaninternational-law-scholarship-and-the-postcolonial-turn/.
62 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law. Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of
Universality (2011).
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form of socio-political organization was normalized, even as difference was seemingly
accommodated by the international community.”63 The RoL is identified as playing a
crucial role in this process, as it provides the powerful master category to capture not
only the descriptive acknowledgment and endorsement of an emerging and in itself
unquestionably justified ‘international rule of law’, but also the prescriptive proposition
that the RoL encapsulate the political-organisational decisions necessary for
‘development’64 – certainly another concept, as will become clear over the course of
Pahuja’s study, what has been high-charged with conflicting assessments of means and
ends. A central finding of Pahuja’s book is her astute observation that this normalization
(in the form of a legally effectively neutralized co-existence of powerful and powerless
states) occurred through law, through the generation of ‘rights’ and the articulation of
claims as ‘legal’ ones. Echoing this observation at the start of her book, her concluding
chapters bring the the historical-critical analysis together in a sobering account of the
seemingly unstoppable triumph march that the “rule of law” had experienced both post1945 and post-1990. Whereas, however, at the end of World War II and during the
concurring struggles of formerly colonized nations to define their however meager role
at the table of the international community, the RoL was invoked as a principle of
desirable political (international order), its invocation since the 1990s came with a
distinct association of the RoL with the actual historical ‘achievement’ of Western
liberalism, human rights and democracy.65 The end of the Cold War came to provide the
historical moment for a long-harbored normative closure: human rights could and,
indeed, should now be defended, fought for and fought over in every corner of the
world, now that their previous ideological ambiguity had given way to universal
recognition.66 With the overcoming of its ideological subtexts at the time of the cold
war, human rights were now rid of all ideology – they were, in other words, “universally
true” and, by implication, free from and immune to any possible contestation.67
Meanwhile, the RoL becomes entrenched as development doctrine, mantra and goal
when it is rhetorically employed to link the imagined international community to the

Id., at 5-6.
Id., at 6.
65 Id., at 178-9.
66 Id., at 180.
67 Id.
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64

18

individuals living (and justifiably enjoying a “right to democracy”68) within states rather
than being the governing principle for the relationship between states.69 As liberal
international relations (IR) scholars such as Anne-Marie Slaughter zero in on the
internal governance structures of the state, the shift from a world of sovereign states to
that of a world community as agent of scrutinizing, protecting as well as, eventually,
disseminating and promoting state-internal democratic governance becomes decisive.70
The particular Western, if not U.S.-driven, experience of institutionalized democratic
market governance becomes the unquestioned blue-print for the Rule of Law71 as
transnational principle and as justification for an ever-accelerating and expanding
managerialist protection machine.72
Professor Pahuya’s award-winning analysis addressed the “instability of international
law” at a time, where the world order had become increasingly and perhaps irrevocably
fragmented and contested. Bringing together a number of critical strands of
international legal thought – from international economic law73 to post-colonialist ‘third
world approaches to international law’74 for a convincing deconstruction of the
international-universalist human rights and RoL imaginary, she offered significant
assistance to concurring and since emerging efforts of recasting the conceptual and
legal framework of the global order – and, remarkably – with the RoL at its center.
The second landmark study which provided us with an unparalleled succinct critique of
the foundations, justifications and operations of the RoL in context was written by
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 American Journal of International
Law 46 (1992), 49.
69 Id., at 182.
70 Id. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1 (1995);
and: Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Anne-Marie Slaughters Liberal Theory of
International Law, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 183 (2001).
71 Id., at 183.
72 For a cutting interpretation from a feminist-legal-theory perspective, see Anne Orford, Muscular
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 679 (2003); see,
equally, her masterful study of the U.N.‘s evolving role as actor in a managerialist enterprise of ‘getting the
job done‘: Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (2011).
73 M Sornarajah, Power and Justice:Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 Singapore Yearbook of
International Law 19 (2006); James Thuo Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic
Governance, in: International Law and the Future 255 (Falk/Rajagopal/Stevens, eds., 2008).
74 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2005); Obiora Chinedu
Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?, 10
International Community Law Review 371 (2008); Ruth Buchanan, Writing Resistance Into International
Law, 10 International Community Law Review 1 (2008).
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Jothie Rajah. Rajah’s book75 offers an inside view into the life of the RoL in the context of
post-1965 Singapore and it is this context which is unfolded in its historical, political,
economic, legal and discursive dimensions. Through an amazingly close reading of
various pieces of Singaporean laws and regulations, Professor Rajah’s study achieves a
unique multiplication of our perspective on and understanding of the RoL. In each
invocation of the RoL by the Singaporean government, its long-time head of state or its
various governmental spokespersons, Rajah makes us see the constitutive role of the
principle by, on the one hand, invoking an external, non-Singaporean tradition, while
extinguishing, invisibilizing and ‘silencing’ pre-existing Singaporean legal traditions, on
the other.76 The “RoL” functions both as invocation of and reverence to the British
Common Law tradition of Dicey and Co. and as governing principle of the here and now
of Singapore’s executive state of necessity.77
Given the immense presence and importance of the ‘RoL’ in Singapore’s political
discourse, the discourse itself becomes the focus of analysis. It is through language, that
power is constituted, divided, denied. Echoing the way that late 19th, early 20th century
legal scholars set out to deconstruct the allegedly value-neutral and objective nature of
legal terms78, Rajah continues this line of inquiry into the work of Foucault and thus is
able to focus specifically on the dimensions of historical specificity and the relationship
between legal language/speech and power.79 Through the course of case studies
pertaining to Singaporean laws on vandalism, press freedom, the legal profession,
religious practices and the public order, Rajah’s analysis follows the state’s and its
various regulatory bodies’ discursive mapping deep into the daily life of regulatory
practices and is thus able to reveal the life between the textual nature of the ‘RoL’ and
its society-and reality-shaping operations.80 Ultimately, the RoL to which the author –
by self-declaration – remains sympathetic,81 has been proven to have achieved the
opposite from what we (might) have been associating it with – with the Singaporean
Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law. Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (2012).
Id., at 35, 37.
77 Id., 39, 42ff, 51. See also id., at 267: “…arguments of exceptionalism and the trope of Singapore’s
perpetual territorial vulnerability.”
78 Just see the account in Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995).
79 Rajah, note 14, at 61.
80 Id., at 223.
81 Id., at 53: “...I ought to declare my own normative inclinations towards a ‘rule of law’ that protects and
upholds political liberalism.”
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state effectively having achieved “the reconfiguration of the profoundly liberal concept
of the ‘rule of law’ into an illiberal ‘rule by law’ through the state’s manipulation of
legislation and public discourse.”82
Rajah’s study has the immeasurable value of providing us with both an illustration and a
counter-example of the nexus, described by Pahuja, between the citizens’ alleged ‘right
to democratic governance’ and the international rule of law as governing principle
between these citizens and the international community – bypassing the sovereign
states and their (rightful, under public international law) claims to govern their internal
affairs. Whereas in Pahuya’s account, we are directed towards a critique of the Western
neo-liberal invocation of the Rule of Law as a free pass to intervene in the affairs of
Slaughter’s ‘non-liberal states’ – all in the name of the RoL – , Rajah dives deep into just
these internal affairs in order to trace the myriad ways in which an illiberal State – all in
claiming the need to adhere to the inexorably global and universally validified rule of
law – can instrumentalize the RoL to authoritarian effects. What Rajah provides us with,
then, is not a further proof of why Slaughter’s bypassing of state government in order to
bring the happy spells of democratic governance directly to the people. Instead, we can
see how the state (in this case Singapore) is doing exactly what the World Bank, the
‘coalition of the willing’ or other zealous RoL advocates have been doing – internally and
externally. While these are invoking the RoL in its pure transcendent (nonsensical83)
form while, in truth, disembedding it from a real world of inequality and post-colonial
blithe, in which the declaration of sovereign equality is a far cry for most, the others
(such as the Singaporean state) call on the RoL in order to justify the repression of local
claims in the name of defending externally resonant rights and principles. As the
normative difference between the international community and its small circle of
(militarily) persuasive spokespeople and authoritarian governments becomes elusive,
what begins to emerge is an ever clearer and more fully accentuated picture of a
fragmented yet fully operational holding structure of transnational managerialism. Such
managerialism has been manifesting itself in various forms – ranging from
‘humanitarian intervention’ to ‘economic’ or ‘technical assistance’ – while in each case
the pertinent justificatory basis has been a rhetoric of necessity and efficiency. The
Id., at 267.
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Columbia Law Review 809
(1935).
82
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displacement of a much more multilayered, eternally open-ended deliberation about
competing and conflicting values by a more output-oriented rationality has significant
consequences for the ability of carrying out a political debate through the means of law
and legal language. Expert language, something we already encountered in our
identification of the powerful effect of indicators as displacing the RoL as actor behind
the numbers – invokes ‘progress’ in international economic development84, ‘stability’
and ‘security’ in the context of national survival85, ‘human suffering’ to justify military
intervention86 or ‘modernisation’ in the case of FDI-related economic liberalization and
urban transformation policies.87 By consequence, it fills the gap that an elusive hope for
global political deliberation has left. In a recent book, David Kennedy offers a sobering
analysis of the increasingly hermeneutically closed, self-referential language regime
that ‘experts’ (lawyers, economists, political scientists) have been making available for
amenable use for every possible ‘crisis’. “Expertise – economic expertise, scientific
expertise, legal expertise, social and political expertise, institutional and managerial
expertise, expertise in the lessons of history and the universal practicalities of everyday
life – fills the bill. Those who exercise the powers of expertise rarely think they are
‘governing the world’. Their mandate and project is always far more specific, their
language more universal. As a result, their powers remain obscure, the opportunity to
identify and contest their rulership vanishing point rare.”88 What makes the power of
expert language so pervasive and at the same time so elusive from the point of view of
political agency, is the matter-of-factness in its ascertainment vis-à-vis ‘problems’
seeking a solution. “Although we might come to see the situation as driven by power
politics, geostrategic interests, regional rivalries, or historic grievance, these also need
to be articulated. They are also made real – or not – through practices that confirm the
analytics. Such modes of interpretation and methods of engagement are developed,

Pahuja 2011.
Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law. Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (2012); see
also Jothie Rajah, 'Rule of Law' as Transnational Legal Order, in: Transnational Legal Orders 340
(Halliday/Shaffer, eds., 2015).
86 Orford 2003; Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
International Law, 65 Modern Law Review 159 (2002); Andreas L. Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the
Future of International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 691
(2004).
87 Priya S. Gupta, Judicial Constructions: Modernity, Economic Liberalization, and the Urban Poor in India,
42 Fordham Urban Law Journal 25 (2014).
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deployed, and defended in specialized terms.”89

IV. Today’s Global Rule of Law: Governance by Drones and Numbers?

What can be summarized at this point, by way of conclusion? There is little doubt today
as regards the centrality of RoL assertions in global governance programmes, but at the
same time the striking number of contestations, be that on the conceptual or the
empirical level, underscores the urgency of further and also differently situated
investigation. What the work by scholars cited in the preceding overview illustrates is a
pressing need for approaches that critically acknowledge and draw on legal-theoretical
and post-colonial scholarship in order to decenter and relativize an otherwise too
narrowly shaped investigation into the past and future of a heavily strained concept.
The legal pluralist engagement with the RoL might point into a promising direction
here. Rather than confirming the cliché of an emerging transnational regulatory order
that dethrones the nation-state, makes a mockery of state-based, governmental
sovereignty and adopts an overly permissive stance as to what counts as ‘law’, hereby
allegedly treating soft and hard, informal and formal law alike, the above analysis has
confirmed something altogether different. Instead of heralding the end of the state and
(its) law, the legal pluralist lens has begun to make visible the many local instantiations
of legal-regulatory regimes in states of transformation. Pahuja’s study, but even more
particularly the analysis offered by Rajah, offered us a convincing testimony of the
battle over the rule of law ‘on the ground’, in very concrete and complex, historically
shaped and presently evolving socio-economic and geopolitical settings. As we continue
to further study the ROL’s continuing diffusion and transformation in the areas of
technical warfare90 and quantification,91 questions of local perspective, input and
contestation will become ever more important.
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